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Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀect of debt and liquidity on corporate investment in a con-
tinuous-time framework. We show that stockholder-bondholder agency conﬂicts cause
investment thresholds to be U-shaped in leverage and decreasing in liquidity. In the ab-
sence of tax eﬀects, we derive the optimal level of liquid funds that eliminates agency
costs by implementing the ﬁrst-best investment policy for a given capital structure. In a
second step we generalize the framework by introducing a tax advantage of debt, and we
show that an interior solution for liquidity and capital structure optimally trades oﬀ tax
beneﬁts and agency costs of debt.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G13, G31, G32
Keywords: investment timing, liquidity, agency costs of debt, capital structure, real optionsI Introduction
Why do ﬁrms hold liquid funds? Most explanations are related to ﬁnancing constraints.
For example, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) state that if a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially
unconstrained, corporate liquidity becomes irrelevant. However, this is only true for an
all-equity ﬁrm, whereas a levered ﬁrm’s investment policy can be subject to agency con-
ﬂicts. In this paper we show that when there is existing debt, liquid funds may mitigate
stockholder-bondholder conﬂicts. This leads to a stand-alone rationale for cash holdings,
even if the ﬁrm’s stockholders are ﬁnancially unconstrained.
More precisely, the level of corporate liquidity inﬂuences the relation between leverage
and investment in a non-trivial way. An intuitive guess might be that the investment
policy distortions due to stockholder-bondholder conﬂicts increase in the ﬁrm’s leverage.
However, we show that this only proves correct in two extreme cases: A ﬁrm without cash
holdings or a ﬁrm with suﬃcient cash holdings to cover the whole investment amount. In
contrast, for the more realistic case of an intermediate level of liquid funds, the relation
between leverage and investment turns out to be non-monotonic. We capture agency
conﬂicts of both underinvestment and overinvestment in a uniﬁed analytic framework, in
which we can isolate their respective pure forms for the two mentioned extreme cases.
Thus, we show that the ﬁrm’s endogenous choice of its level of liquid funds can be the
key factor that determines the eﬀect of existing debt on investment timing.
The underinvestment problem was ﬁrst treated explicitly by Myers (1977): When debt is
in place, it can be optimal from the stockholders’ perspective to forgo investment oppor-
tunities that would be favorable for an all-equity ﬁrm, since the contributed investment
amount is beneﬁcial for the bondholders as well.1 In our model, whenever the ﬁrm does
not have any free liquid funds, the whole investment amount has to be injected by the
stockholders. This corresponds to a pure asset expansion case and induces underinvest-
ment.
1Subsequently, the underinvestment issue has been examined by many other authors, see for example
Mello and Parsons (1992), who model the operating policy of a levered mine in a continuous-time dy-
namic approach, Mauer and Ott (2000), who analyze optimal capital structure and mitigation of agency
problems, or a recent paper by Moyen (2007) for an analysis of debt maturity and underinvestment.
1The opposite problem of overinvestment as a consequence of debt ﬁnancing is usually
related to the asset substitution problem based on Jensen and Meckling (1976).2 In our
model, this arises when the ﬁrm’s liquidity is suﬃcient to allow investment using internal
funds only. Then, no additional capital is needed and pure asset substitution can take
place, in the sense that the risk-free liquid funds are replaced by a risky investment
project. This bears incentives to overinvest, since the stockholders are willing to invest in
projects that would not be pursued from a total ﬁrm perspective.
As a consequence, we can show that the resulting investment threshold for a levered ﬁrm,
i.e., the level of project value required for investment to take place, is strictly decreasing
in the ﬁrm’s liquid funds. Since the two extreme cases mentioned are characterized by
underinvestment and overinvestment, respectively, there is an interior level of liquid funds
that implements the investment policy of an all-equity ﬁrm.
In our continuous-time dynamic investment timing framework, the impact of liquidity
on investment is not driven by ﬁnancing constraints stemming from transaction costs
or information asymmetries.3 Instead, we assume symmetric information, which allows
issuance of fairly priced securities and excludes ﬁnancing constraints. Thus, the non-
existence of binding contracts on investment policy is the only friction in our model. We
assume that the ﬁrm is managed by an entrepreneur as its sole stockholder. Furthermore,
we consider a ﬁrm with a proprietary project, so there are no eﬀects of competition on
product markets.4 Therefore we can focus exclusively on the implications of the level of
liquid funds for the stockholder-bondholder conﬂict and thus for the ﬁrm’s investment
timing decision.5
2One recent example is the paper by Mauer and Sarkar (2005), who analyze overinvestment in the
context of a conditional debt contract.
3A large strand of literature, in contrast, does deal exactly with the impact of ﬁnancing constraints
on investment policy. An early example is the empirical study by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988).
Recent approaches by Boyle and Guthrie (2003), Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2007), and Lyandres (2007)
are more related to our paper since they also model investment timing and therefore can capture overin-
vestment as well, in their case however resulting from ﬁnancing constraints.
4See Grenadier (2002) and Jou and Lee (2008) for an incorporation of competition in a similar frame-
work.
5See Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the possible
determinants of the optimal level of liquid funds mentioned in this paragraph, and Faulkender and Wang
(2006), who show how the value of cash depends on its likely use.
2We derive the following three implications: Firstly, the levered ﬁrm’s investment threshold
is U-shaped in leverage, whenever a part of the investment amount is covered by internal
liquid funds. This can be explained by the fact that risk-shifting incentives are more im-
portant for small amounts of debt, but for higher leverage the underinvestment argument
becomes predominant. The second implication further emphasizes the central role of liq-
uid funds: In the absence of tax eﬀects and for a given leverage, investment thresholds
are decreasing in liquidity. There is an optimal level of liquidity that eliminates agency
costs by implementing the ex ante optimal investment policy. Generalizing the framework
by introducing tax beneﬁts as a reason why the ﬁrm initially chooses a positive amount
of debt, we derive the third implication: The importance of the level of liquidity remains
valid, and there is an interior combination of liquid funds and leverage that trades oﬀ tax
beneﬁts and agency costs of debt. It should therefore be observable that especially ﬁrms
with signiﬁcant growth opportunities have a target level of liquid funds, even if they are
ﬁnancially unconstrained.
In fact, already Myers (1977) suggested in his seminal article that a restriction on div-
idends, thus retaining cash for future investment, might be a way to mitigate the un-
derinvestment problem, and he contrasted the beneﬁts of this idea with the Jensen and
Meckling (1976) problem.6 However, to our knowledge this comment has not led to sub-
sequent research dealing with under- and overinvestment that would explicitly allow the
ﬁrm to vary its level of liquid funds upon debt issuance in order to endogenously mitigate
agency problems.7
There are other authors who discuss both under- and overinvestment in a uniﬁed mod-
elling framework, without however emphasizing the role of liquid funds in this context.
Similar to our paper, Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005) attribute the contrary investment
situations of asset expansion and asset substitution to under- and overinvestment, respec-
6An empirical study by Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) shows that debt covenants, in particular
dividend restrictions, can reduce agency conﬂicts on the exercise of growth options.
7An article by Morellec (2001) discusses the liquidity of existing assets and implications for agency
costs and capital structure. However the focus is not on ﬁnancing investment, but on disinvestment in
order to ﬁnance the ﬁrm’s continued operation. An empirical study by Bates (2005) shows that the
proceeds of subsidiary sales are retained more frequently if there are future growth opportunities, though
this may cause agency costs of overinvestment.
3tively. In contrast to our approach, their asset side before investment is exogenous. Thus,
the ﬁrm cannot inﬂuence whether it is in a regime of asset expansion or asset substitution.
Analyzing the dynamic adjustment of debt levels and debt maturity, Childs, Mauer, and
Ott (2005) ﬁnd that agency costs become insigniﬁcant if dynamic adjustment is possi-
ble, while Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) show that agency costs can remain signiﬁcant,
if the stockholders choose a recapitalization policy that is suboptimal from a total ﬁrm
perspective. Parrino and Weisbach (1999) examine the magnitude of under- and overin-
vestment and their sensitivity on ﬁrm characteristics within a simulation study. These
authors conclude that the agency costs of debt as such are too small to explain capital
structure decisions for the average ﬁrm. But especially for high-risk ﬁrms, they ﬁnd that
the disregard of agency costs can lead to a signiﬁcant loss in ﬁrm value. In our paper, we
have an entrepreneurial ﬁrm with a high-risk project in mind. Therefore we also consider
agency costs to be an important factor for the decisions of such a ﬁrm.
Two recent papers elaborate on the fact that agency costs of both under- and overinvest-
ment can be mitigated if a part of the investment amount is ﬁnanced by a new debt issue
upon investment: Sarkar (2007) shows that depending on the relative importance of tax
beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs, the stockholders’ optimal ex post policy does generally
not eliminate the agency costs of debt. Lyandres and Zhdanov (2008) separate over- from
underinvestment and focus on the eﬀect of the leverage level on the ﬁrm’s investment
timing. They illustrate a diﬀerent rationale for overinvestment: Instead of focusing on the
asset-substitution problem, they show that there can be overinvestment due to the threat
of costly default, which reduces the value of waiting.
Debt ﬁnancing is a time-consuming process, whereas holding cash ensures the full invest-
ment timing ﬂexibility. This could be a possible argument precluding a new debt issuance
simultaneously with the ex ante uncertain point in time when investment takes place. It is
often assumed that cash holdings and debt oﬀset each other and only the net debt of the
ﬁrm should matter. However, as Gamba and Triantis (2008) show, in some situations a
ﬁrm should rather increase its cash holdings than reduce its debt. In their setting, this can
for example be the case if debt issuance costs exceed the costs of holding liquid funds. We
4concentrate on the extreme case with no additional debt issuance during the model hori-
zon, which could be interpreted as inﬁnitely high debt issuance costs. But even if there is
only some delay between debt issuance and possible investment, this would justify liquid
funds as a useful tool to both ensure investment timing ﬂexibility and mitigate agency
conﬂicts.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II we set up our modelling framework. In
Section III we analyze the levered ﬁrm’s investment threshold, and we derive the optimal
amount of liquid funds given an exogenous capital structure and no tax eﬀects. Then we
discuss the interaction of liquid funds and capital structure in Section IV given that there
is a tax advantage of debt ﬁnancing. Section V relates the implications of our work to
existing literature. Section VI concludes.
II Model
A Framework
We consider a partially debt-ﬁnanced ﬁrm at time t that holds the perpetual rights worth
F o(V ) to a project whose value V follows the geometric Brownian motion
(1) dV =( μ − δ)Vd t+ σVdW
where μ, δ,a n dσ are constant parameters and W is a Wiener process. The superscript
o denotes the levered ﬁrm before investment, in contrast to other states of the ﬁrm that
will be introduced below. Besides the project rights, the ﬁrm holds an amount X in liquid
funds on a money market account.
The ﬁrm does not have any further assets in place besides the project rights and the
liquid funds. This describes a realistic situation for an entrepreneurial ﬁrm in its start-up
phase:8 An entrepreneur has a unique idea for a project. She then becomes the founder
8One could also think of some existing assets that are not explicitly modelled since their dynamics are
5of a ﬁrm and is deciding upon the ﬁnancing policy for her project rights. We assume that
she will issue a certain amount of debt and become the stockholder of a levered ﬁrm.
Moreover, she may provide some liquid funds to the ﬁrm in order to cover a part of the
future investment expenses.
While the liquid funds remain constant until investment takes place, they generate a risk-
free income stream rX that is distributed to the entrepreneur, where r is the constant
risk-free interest rate.9 This may be interpreted as a debt covenant preventing dividend
payments to drive the ﬁrm’s cash holdings below X.
At any point in time, the entrepreneur has the option to exercise the project rights.
The investment requires a total amount of I, and we assume X ∈ [0,I]. Therefore the
entrepreneur has to provide the missing amount I−X needed to launch the project and to
change the ﬁrm’s asset side from F o(V )+X to V . After investment the project provides a
cash-ﬂow stream of δV, therefore there are opportunity costs of waiting, and the ﬁrm will
invest as soon as a critical project value V o
I , the investment threshold, is exceeded. This
threshold determines the ﬁrm’s investment timing policy, since ceteris paribus investment
will take place earlier given that the ﬁrm decides to invest at a lower threshold.
The extreme case of X = 0 can be described as pure asset expansion: The whole invest-
ment amount has to be contributed by the entrepreneur, which leads to a substantial
increase in total ﬁrm value. In contrast, the case of X = I can be described as pure
asset substitution: There is no capital inﬂow upon investment, but the risk-free returns of
the liquid funds are substituted by the risky project returns. For intermediate values of
X ∈ (0,I), we can model a wide variety of investment conditions.
The debt structure consists of one perpetual coupon bond with a continuous coupon
only of second-order importance for the investment timing problem analyzed here. A related article by
Mauer and Sarkar (2005) models a similarly reduced ﬁrm consisting only of an investment option and a
conditional debt contract.
9There are several reasons why one could assume that the liquid funds yield a lower return than r,f o r
example taxation of interest income. For expositional simplicity, we do not model such frictions in the
paper. While the arguments in Section III do not require taxes at all, we have veriﬁed that the qualitative
results in Section IV remain unchanged if the liquid funds only yield (1 − ν)rX, where the case ν = τ
corresponds to an equal taxation of debt coupon payments (introduced later) and interest income as the
only reason for a lower return on X.
6stream of C. While we ﬁrst take the debt structure as given, we will later also discuss
the debt issuance decision. Assuming a simple tax environment where coupon payments
are tax-deductible at the ﬁrm level, the after-tax debt service is (1 − τ)C,w h e r eτ is the
corporate tax rate.10 Debt service is partly covered by the entrepreneur’s income stream
rX from the liquid funds. However, the remaining amount of
(2) (1 − τ)C − rX,
which is constant over time as long as the ﬁrm is in state o, has to be contributed by
the entrepreneur. The total value of the entrepreneur’s claim Eo(V ) and the bondholder’s




o(V )+X + T
o(V ),
where T o(V ) denotes the value of tax beneﬁts. Note that the entrepreneur will never have
a reason to default before investment if the income from the ﬁrm’s liquid funds is suﬃcient
to cover the required payment, i.e., if Eq. (2) is negative.
However, if Eq. (2) is positive, then the ﬁrm declares bankruptcy as soon as the en-
trepreneur decides to no longer provide the necessary payments. This is the case as soon
as a critical project value of V o
B is underrun. Then the entrepreneur has no more rights or




The superscript e is used to indicate the state of the all-equity ﬁrm before investment.
Note that we model no direct costs of bankruptcy, which is only for the sake of simplicity
and could be easily incorporated in our framework. Still, the value of the project rights
F e(V ) generally diﬀers from F o(V ) because the former bondholder, now stockholder of
an all-equity ﬁrm, will adopt an investment timing policy V e
I that can be diﬀerent from
10Similar to Leland (1994) and Mauer and Sarkar (2005), we assume that the ﬁrm always receives the
tax beneﬁts when it is solvent, regardless of its current operating income.
7the levered ﬁrm’s policy V o
I .
In contrast, if the critical project value V o
I is exceeded before bankruptcy has been de-
clared, the project is launched. After investment the ﬁrm’s assets consist solely of the
project V providing a cash-ﬂow stream of δV, which the entrepreneur receives as a divi-
dend after the net coupon stream, i.e.,
(5) δV − (1 − τ)C.
In case of δV − (1 − τ)C<0, the entrepreneur has to contribute the remaining part of
the coupon in order to avoid triggering default. The ﬁrm’s balance in state i is
(6) E
i(V )+D
i(V )=V + T
i(V ),
where the superscript i denotes the state of the ﬁrm after investment. Once the invest-
ment project has been launched, the evolution of the asset value follows an exogenous
process given by Eq. (1), and the only decision remaining to the entrepreneur is to de-
clare bankruptcy by not paying the coupons anymore. This will be the case as soon as
a critical project value of V i
B is underrun. Similar to the new investment policy in state
e, the default policy V i
B after investment can be diﬀerent from the default policy before
investment V o
B.
When the ﬁrm after investment (state i) declares bankruptcy, the former bondholder takes




where the superscript ie denotes the state of the all-equity ﬁrm after investment.W e
end up in the same situation when the all-equity ﬁrm (state e) eventually launches the
investment project. However, note that in the latter case the former bondholder has to
provide the missing amount I − X for the transition from state e to ie, while this has
been the entrepreneur’s responsibility at the transition from state o to i.
8The transitions from one state to another contingent on the evolution of the project value
V are visualized in Fig. 1.
[Fig. 1]
B Basic claims
In order to derive solutions for the entrepreneur’s and bondholder’s claims in the diﬀerent
states, we evaluate three basic cash-ﬂow types, which will form the building blocks of all
the solutions in the following subsections.11 Once their values are given, the entrepreneur’s
and bondholder’s claims can be viewed as a portfolio of these three basic claims, which
allows convenient representations and insightful interpretations.
To deﬁne the cash ﬂows of our basic claims, we assume that the current project value
V is between a lower bound of VB, interpreted as a bankruptcy threshold, and an upper
bound of VI, interpreted as an investment threshold, with VB <V I. A lower bound
of VB = 0 means that default can never occur, which is due to the properties of the
stochastic process in Eq. (1). Similarly, an upper bound of VI = ∞ means that there is
no investment opportunity.
We denote by BI(V ;VB,V I) the value of a claim that pays oﬀ 1 as soon as VI is reached
and becomes worthless at VB. Besides that it yields no intermediate payments. Given that
the risk inherent in V can be replicated by traded securities, it can be shown that BI





2(BI)VV +( r − δ)V (BI)V = rBI ∀V ∈ [VB,V I]
with (BI)V and (BI)VV denoting ﬁrst and second derivatives with respect to V , respec-
tively. Solving subject to the boundary conditions BI(VB;VB,V I)=0a n dBI(VI;VB,V I)=
11This can be seen as an time-homogenous extension of Ericsson and Reneby (1998), who present
building blocks for bond valuation given only a lower (bankruptcy) threshold, to a situation with both a
lower and an upper bound, where the latter will be the investment threshold in our context.
91 yields the solution
BI(V ;VB,V I)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩





, if VB =0a n dV< V I < ∞
(VB)λ2·V λ1−(VB)λ1·V λ2




































Similarly, BB(V ;VB,V I) denotes the value of a claim that pays oﬀ 1 upon reaching VB,
however becomes worthless when the project value hits VI. Besides that it also yields
no intermediate payments. It satisﬁes the same diﬀerential equation as BI, while the
boundary conditions are BB(VB;VB,V I)=1a n dBB(VI;VB,V I) = 0. Its value is
BB(V ;VB,V I)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩





, if VI = ∞ and 0 <V B <V
(VI)λ1·V λ2−(VI)λ2·V λ1
(VI)λ1(VB)λ2−(VI)λ2(VB)λ1, if VI < ∞ and 0 <V B <V <V I.
The third claim with value BO(V ;VB,V I) yields a stream of the risk-free rate r as long
as the project value stays in between VB and VI.I tc a nb es h o w nt ob ew o r t h
BO(V ;VB,V I)=1− BI(V ;VB,V I) − BB(V ;VB,V I).
Note that in order to implement a strategy that yields the risk-free rate as long as the
project value remains within the interval (VB,V I)a n dap a y o ﬀo f1u p o nr e a c h i n ge i t h e r
10bound, a capital investment of one monetary unit is needed. Therefore the three basic
claims add up to 1.
These three basic claims can now be used in order to solve the model backwards. The
value of the entrepreneur’s claim in the ie state is already known to be V . We will now
ﬁrst give the solutions to the e and i states, which are well-known from the literature.
Afterwards we will use them to derive the values of the entrepreneur’s and bondholder’s
claims in the levered ﬁrm before investment (state o), which is one of the contributions
of this paper.
C All-equity ﬁrm’s investment decision
The assets of the ﬁrm after default (state e) as given by Eq. (4) consist of the project rights
F e(V ) and the liquid funds X. Since the ﬁrm after default corresponds to an all-equity
ﬁrm with ﬁnancially unconstrained stockholders, the ﬁrm’s liquid funds do not have an
impact on the investment decision, and the project rights can be valued in a classical real-
option framework.12 Before investment, they can be interpreted as a portfolio consisting
of (V e
I −I) units of the basic claim BI yielding one monetary unit upon investment. The







I − I) · BI(V ;0,Ve
I ), if 0 ≤ V ≤ V e
I








ensures that immediate investment is indeed optimal above the critical project value V e
I .
12See McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).







D Levered ﬁrm after investment
Similarly, existing literature provides solutions for the values of the entrepreneur’s and
bondholder’s claims in the levered ﬁrm after investment (state i), when the ﬁrm’s liquid
funds have been used up in order to launch the investment project, and there is no more
optionality on the asset side.13
We start with the value of the entrepreneur’s claim Ei(V ). The entrepreneur’s position
after investment consists of holding the project value and paying the net coupon stream
until default, when they also lose their claim to the project value. Therefore the solution






0, if 0 ≤ V ≤ V i
B
V − V i
B · BB(V ;V i
B,∞) −
(1−τ)C
r · BO(V ;V i








ensures that the bankruptcy threshold V i
B indeed maximizes the value of the entrepreneur’s










For a project value V above the bankruptcy threshold V i
B, the value of the bondholder’s
claim Di(V ) can be interpreted as a portfolio of a claim that provides the payment V i
B
13See Black and Cox (1976) and Leland (1994).







V, if 0 ≤ V ≤ V i
B
V i
B · BB(V ;V i
B,∞)+C
r · BO(V ;V i
B,∞), if V> V i
B.
Note that there is no new ﬁrst-order condition; the bankruptcy threshold V i
B is chosen by
the entrepreneur and thus given by Eq. (14).
E Levered ﬁrm before investment
Having presented solutions for the e and i states, and thus for the boundaries of the o
state, we are now ready to derive the values of the entrepreneur’s and bondholder’s claims
in the levered ﬁrm before investment.
The value of the entrepreneur’s claim Eo(V ) in the levered ﬁrm before investment can be
interpreted as a portfolio consisting of a cash-ﬂow stream of rX −(1−τ)C, while neither
investment nor default occurs, and a payment of Ei(V o
I ) − (I − X) upon investment at
V o





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩











I ) − (I − X)) · BI(V ;V o
B,Vo
I ), if V o
B <V <Vo
I
Ei(V ) − (I − X), if V ≥ V o
I
In order to derive the optimal investment and bankruptcy thresholds, we have to consider











13which ensures that the resulting investment threshold V o
I indeed maximizes the value of
the entrepreneur’s claim. Note that we thus assume that the ﬁrm follows the second-best
investment policy after debt issuance. In Section IV we compare this to the ﬁrst-best in-
vestment policy, i.e., the policy that maximizes the sum of the values of the entrepreneur’s
and bondholder’s claims. If default is possible at all (i.e., if Eq. (2) and thus V o
B is positive),






ensures that the resulting bankruptcy threshold V o
B also maximizes the value of the en-
trepreneur’s claim. In the case of V o
B = 0, we do not need a second ﬁrst-order condition.
Then the value of the entrepreneur’s claim for V ≤ V o
I reduces to
(19) E
o(V )=X +( E
i(V
o

















In this case, note that the ﬁrst derivative Eo
V(V ) does not depend on the liquid funds
X, and consequently the optimal investment threshold V o
I according to Eq. (17) is also
independent of X. This makes sense, because there is no risk for the entrepreneur that the
liquid funds X be transferred to the bondholder in the event of default before investment.
Therefore, her investment decision is independent of the fraction of the investment amount
held as liquid funds within the ﬁrm, although this fraction determines the additional
amount I − X she has to contribute.
Now we consider the value of the bondholder’s claim Do(V ). It corresponds to a portfolio
that consists of the right to receive Ee(V o
B) upon default, a stream of C while neither
14default nor investment occurs, and Di(V o




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
Ee(V ), if 0 ≤ V ≤ V o
B
Ee(V o
B) · BB(V ;V o
B,Vo
I )+C




I ) · BI(V ;V o
B,Vo
I ), if V o
B <V <Vo
I
Di(V ), if V ≥ V o
I

















since the right to receive Ee(V o
B) upon default has no value.
Note that there are no new ﬁrst-order conditions, since the entrepreneur has the exclusive
right to choose the investment and bankruptcy policies that are value-maximizing from
her perspective. Therefore, both V o
B and V o
I result from the maximization of the value of
the entrepreneur’s claim given by Eq. (16), captured by the conditions in Eq. (17) and
Eq. (18).
III Underinvestment, overinvestment, and liquidity
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss how the relation between the ﬁrm’s leverage and its invest-
ment policy is aﬀected by the liquid funds. In a second step, we take the ﬁrm’s leverage as
given and analyze the eﬀect of the ﬁrm’s liquid funds as such on the investment policy. For
both cases, we also discuss the sensitivity of our results to project risk. Throughout the
current section, we abstract from tax eﬀects (τ = 0), which implies T i(V )=T o(V )=0 .
This allows us to focus solely on agency costs, i.e., the value eﬀect of suboptimal invest-
ment. In Section IV we will then discuss the interaction of liquidity and capital structure
choice given that there is a positive tax rate (τ>0), which induces an advantage of debt
ﬁnancing and therefore a reason to initially issue debt.
15When solving for the value of the entrepreneur’s claim Eo(V )i nE q .( 1 6 ) ,w eh a v et o
determine at the same time the investment and bankruptcy policies of the levered ﬁrm
before investment, V o
I and V o
B. Throughout this section we assume that the levered ﬁrm
follows the second-best investment policy, i.e., the policy that is maximizing the value
of the entrepreneur’s claim after debt issuance. Since we do not consider tax eﬀects in
this section, the ﬁrst-best policy would be to choose the investment threshold V e
I of the
all-equity ﬁrm. Therefore we compare the levered ﬁrm’s investment policy to that of an
all-equity ﬁrm. Note that the investment threshold V e
I of the all-equity ﬁrm given by Eq.
(11) is not dependent on the ﬁrm’s liquid funds X. In contrast, the investment policy of
the levered ﬁrm crucially depends on X.
In order to link the investment threshold and thus the investment timing decision of
a levered ﬁrm to the notions of under- and overinvestment, we introduce the following
deﬁnitions:14 Whenever the investment threshold V o
I of the levered ﬁrm is higher than the
benchmark investment threshold V e
I of an all-equity ﬁrm, investment will ceteris paribus
take place later, which we regard as underinvestment. On the other hand, if the levered
ﬁrm chooses an investment threshold that is lower than the benchmark, we speak of
overinvestment.
A Eﬀect of leverage on investment policy
We ﬁrst discuss the eﬀect of leverage, measured by the debt coupon C, on the ﬁrm’s
investment policy. As a starting point we take that an unlevered ﬁrm (C = 0) follows the
investment policy V e
I regardless of its level of liquid funds. However, Fig. 2 illustrates that
the eﬀect of positive leverage does depend on the ﬁrm’s cash holdings.
[Fig. 2]
Our numerical example uses a set of parameters given in Table 1. The absolute level of
the project investment cost I is just a scaling factor. In fact, whenever we plot investment
14These deﬁnitions can similarly be found e.g. in Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005) and Lyandres and
Zhdanov (2008).
16thresholds, we normalize them by the unlevered ﬁrm’s investment threshold V e
I ,w h i c hi s
linear in I according to Eq. (11). The rather high volatility parameter σ and the high
cash-ﬂow rate δ relative to the risk-free interest rate r can be motivated by the fact that
we are interested particularly in high-risk projects as they are typical for entrepreneurial
ﬁrms. In particular the eﬀect of varying project risk σ will be analyzed further in the
following.
[Table 1]
For X = 0 we observe the pure asset expansion case: The entrepreneur is primarily
concerned about the fact that the amount that she has to contribute to the ﬁrm also
beneﬁts the bondholder. Therefore she is reluctant to launch the investment project unless
the project value is suﬃciently favorable. As a consequence, the ﬁrm requires a higher




I > 1). Thus the ﬁrm follows a
policy that can be described as underinvestment, similar to the problem discussed by
Myers (1977). This eﬀect becomes more and more pronounced with increasing leverage.
Therefore the investment threshold rises more and more above the unlevered ﬁrm’s level
of V e
I .
Next we discuss the case X = I, which is the pure asset substitution case ﬁrst treated by
Jensen and Meckling (1976). The value of the entrepreneur’s claim makes up only a part
of the total ﬁrm value when there is debt in the ﬁrm. Therefore the entrepreneur bears
relatively less risk than the owner of an all-equity ﬁrm when they substitute the risk-free
returns of the liquid funds by the risky project returns. The entrepreneur should then be





I < 1). Thus she follows a policy that can be described as overinvestment.
The higher the debt level, the more favorable will this policy be for the entrepreneur.
Therefore worse and worse projects are accepted for increasing leverage. The investment
threshold is strictly decreasing in C, with an inﬂection point when Eq. (2) changes signs
and debt becomes risky (which is the case for C = 5 in the numerical example), until
it hits the bankruptcy threshold (at C = 22). In this degenerate case, and for any even
higher coupons C,t h eo state disappears completely.
17To summarize, for either of these pure cases of under- and overinvestment, respectively, we
observe that the distortions in investment policy resulting from stockholder-bondholder
conﬂicts are increasing in the ﬁrm’s leverage measured by the debt coupon C. This result
is consistent with the simulation study by Parrino and Weisbach (1999). However, these
authors explain under- and overinvestment in a static framework by diﬀerent project
characteristics, while their project is ﬁnanced entirely with equity.
Both cases embody another eﬀect that is isolated by Lyandres and Zhdanov (2008): The
loss of the option value (from the stockholders’ perspective) in the event of default induces
early exercise in order to increase equity value, i.e., the X = 0 threshold is rising less
steeply and the X = I threshold is falling faster due to this additional eﬀect.
The combination of the X =0a n dt h eX = I cases leads to an investment threshold that
is U-shaped in leverage for any interior level of liquid funds. For a small debt coupon,
Eq. (2) is negative, and default will never take place before investment. Note that in this
region, there is no risk that the liquid funds X will be transferred to the bondholder before
investment, and therefore the investment threshold is independent of X, as discussed
in Section E. Therefore, all the thresholds in Fig. 2 coincide in the no-default region.
Here we have a particularly strong form of risk-shifting: While there is no default risk
before investment, the entrepreneur can actually transform the bondholder’s claim into
a default-risky one by proceeding with the investment. This becomes more favorable, as
the leverage level increases. Therefore the investment threshold in the no-default region
is strictly decreasing in the debt coupon.
However, if there is default risk both before and after investment, then the investment
decision depends on X: Investment becomes the more favorable, the more liquid funds
there are already within the ﬁrm. For high X, the advantage of shifting risk to the bond-
holder still dominates. But for low X, it now matters that the additional funds needed for
investment have to be provided by the entrepreneur and become part of the defaultable
assets after investment. Therefore, the underinvestment motive observed in its pure form
for X = 0 becomes more and more important. Consequently, we can observe that for in-
creasing coupon levels, the investment threshold for intermediate X keeps ﬁrst decreasing
18after leaving the no-default region, but eventually reaches its minimum and starts rising
again. For suﬃciently high leverage, even the all-equity threshold V e
I is exceeded.
From a practical perspective, the intermediate case might be the most realistic one: One
part of the amount required for investment is covered by the liquid funds already in the
ﬁrm, and the remaining part has to be injected upon investment. Therefore we conclude
that also the U-shape of the investment threshold in leverage is the most realistic descrip-
tion of investment behavior. To our knowledge, this is an essentially new contribution of
our paper. It results from the fact that we account for the role of the ﬁrm’s liquid funds
for both over- and underinvestment.
B Eﬀect of liquid funds on investment policy
Now we analyze the implications of the ﬁrm’s liquid funds as such on the investment pol-
icy. We claim that the investment threshold V o
I of the levered ﬁrm should be decreasing





I > 1), explained above in its pure form for X = 0, are predominant.





I < 1) found in its pure form for X = I are predominant. Consequently, we
expect that there will be an intermediate level X∗
0 of liquid funds (the subscript 0 indicates
the τ = 0 case discussed throughout Section III) for which the levered ﬁrm follows the




I =1 ) .
[Fig. 3]
Fig. 3 shows that the levered ﬁrm’s investment threshold indeed has the proposed shape,
i.e., it is decreasing in the ﬁrm’s liquid funds X. Again we use the set of parameters given
i nT a b l e1 ,a n dt h ed e b tc o u p o nr a t ei ss e tt oC0 = 27. The eﬀect shown in Fig. 3 for
the whole range of possible X values is also visible in Fig. 2 for this ﬁxed C0 and selected
values of X. Moreover, Fig. 2 reveals that for X = I, the coupon level C0 is indeed in the
range where the investment threshold coincides with the bankruptcy threshold, which is
where the threshold is pulled down to at the right margin of Fig. 3. There is an optimal
19amount of liquid funds X∗
0 =6 4 .51 for which the levered ﬁrm follows the all-equity ﬁrm’s
investment policy (V o
I = V e
I ). Otherwise, the ﬁrm chooses an investment policy that is
suboptimal from a ﬁrst-best perspective.
C Eﬀect of project risk on investment policy
Intuitively, we should expect that project risk spurs the entrepreneur’s incentives to over-
invest, since risk-shifting becomes even more attractive. However, would this also mean
that whenever the investment threshold is above the ﬁrst-best level, the underinvestment
problem is mitigated by increasing project risk?
[Fig. 4]
Indeed, Fig. 4 shows that the levered ﬁrm’s investment threshold relative to the all-equity
ﬁrm’s threshold is decreasing in the project value volatility σ in areas with overinvestment
as well as underinvestment. This relation shown for the case of X = X∗
0 and varying C in
the ﬁrst graph of Fig. 4 holds similarly for any other level of liquid funds, including the
two extreme cases of X =0a n dX = I: Even for X = 0 where there is underinvestment
for any positive amount of debt (see Fig. 2), the underinvestment problem is mitigated
for increasing project risk.
Besides reconﬁrming the negative relation of project risk and investment threshold, the
second graph of Fig. 4 for the case of C = C0 and varying X allows the following interpre-
tation: Given a certain leverage level measured by C, the optimal amount of liquid funds
X∗ needed in order to implement the ﬁrst-best investment policy V e
I (i.e., the amount of
liquid funds that yields V o
I /V e
I = 1) is decreasing in project risk: While the entrepreneur’s
overinvestment incentives are increasing in project risk, her desire can be tamed by in-
creasing the amount I−X that she has to contribute to the investment. Therefore reducing
X makes the entrepreneur more reluctant to invest early in risky projects. This can be
used to counterbalance the eﬀect of increasing project risk.
At this point, note that the preceding discussion has focussed on the relative investment
threshold V o
I /V e
I . However, the investment threshold V e
I of an all-equity ﬁrm is itself
20strictly increasing in project risk σ.
That is the usual behavior expected from option pricing theory, since the value of waiting is
increasing in σ, but contrary to the sensitivity of the relative investment threshold V o
I /V e
I .
Examining directly the absolute investment threshold V o
I shows a more diverse picture:
For low liquid funds, it is also increasing in σ.I fe . g .X = 0, the entire investment amount
has to be provided by the entrepreneur. Therefore the incentives are exactly those known
from option pricing theory. The relative investment threshold V o
I /V e
I is still decreasing in
σ due to the fact that the increase of V e
I in σ is more pronounced than that of V o
I .F o rt h e
other extreme case X = I, the entrepreneur has risk-shifting incentives, since investment
does not only mean to give up the value of waiting, but also to transform risk-free into
risky assets. These incentives are obviously increasing in project risk, and they can be
more important than the increasing value of waiting known from option pricing theory.
Therefore, even the absolute investment threshold V o
I of the levered ﬁrm can be decreasing
in σ in this case.
D Agency costs
Now we analyze the agency costs that the ﬁrm suﬀers due to a suboptimal investment
policy induced by existing debt. In this context the term ’suboptimal’ refers to the total
ﬁrm’s perspective. We determined the ﬁrm’s policy in Section E to be optimal from the
entrepreneur’s point of view ex post, i.e., after debt is in place. However, ex ante, i.e.,
before debt is in place, it would be in the interest of the entrepreneur if she could credibly
commit herself to the investment policy of an all-equity ﬁrm, since at that point in time,
the debt contract will be set up according to the assumed investment policy. Therefore
ex ante the entrepreneur maximizes the sum of the values of the entrepreneur’s and
bondholder’s claims, i.e., total ﬁrm value, and it would be suboptimal not to commit to
the all-equity ﬁrm’s investment policy. Consequently, agency costs arise since we assume
that this ex ante commitment is not possible.
We deﬁne agency costs AC for a tax rate of τ = 0 as the diﬀerence in total ﬁrm value
21between an all-equity ﬁrm and a levered ﬁrm:
(21) ACτ=0 = E
e(V ) − [E
o(V )+D
o(V )] = F
e(V ) − F
o(V ).
Ee(V ), Eo(V ), and Do(V ) are deﬁned by Eq. (4), Eq. (16), and Eq. (20), respectively. The
agency costs can then be understood as the part of all-equity ﬁrm value that is lost due
to the suboptimal investment policy. Using Eq. (3), Eq. (4), and T o(V ) = 0 for τ =0 ,w e
get the last expression, which illustrates that the agency costs for τ = 0 exactly consist
of the loss in option value due to the deviation from the all-equity investment policy.
As elaborated in Section B, the ﬁrm’s liquid funds have a crucial impact on the nature
of investment distortions and consequently on the agency costs. A low-liquidity levered
ﬁrm chooses a higher investment threshold than an all-equity ﬁrm, resulting in agency
costs of underinvestment. On the other hand, the investment threshold of a high-liquidity
levered ﬁrm is lower compared to that of an all-equity ﬁrm, resulting in agency costs of
overinvestment. Only for an intermediate level of liquid funds X∗
0 there are no agency
costs.
[Fig. 5]
Fig. 5 shows the agency costs of debt for an initial project value of V0 =0 .75V e
I = 319.92,
which is also indicated by a horizontal line in Fig. 3. When we compare the two ﬁgures,
we see that indeed only for X = X∗
0 =6 4 .51 there are no agency costs. For lower levels
of liquid funds, i.e., X<X ∗
0, the investment threshold V o
I , and thus the agency costs of
underinvestment, are both increasing with distance from X∗
0.
On the other hand, for X>X ∗
0 the investment threshold V o
I is decreasing with distance
from X∗
0, and consequently the agency costs of overinvestment are increasing. However,
since we assume an initial project value of V0 =0 .75V e
I <Ve
I , a new situation arises if the
ﬁrm’s liquid funds are high enough that the investment threshold V o
I falls below the initial
project value V0. Going back to Fig. 3, we observe that this happens for X>83.83. Then
immediate investment will take place right after debt issuance, whereas the all-equity
ﬁrm would prefer to postpone the investment. In all of these states, we do no longer have
22possible future overinvestment, but actual overinvestment, and thus for all X>83.83 the
agency costs of overinvestment remain at
F
e(V ) − (V − I),
which is a constant value and not dependent on X.
A similar result arises for an initial project value V0 >Ve
I , for which the all-equity ﬁrm
invests immediately: Below a certain level of liquid funds X, the investment threshold V o
I
exceeds V0, and underinvestment takes place. Then the agency costs of underinvestment
are
V − I − F
o(V ).
They are increasing for decreasing liquid funds X,s i n c eF o(V ) becomes less valuable
with the distance of X and X∗
0. In contrast, for suﬃciently high X we have V0 ≥ V o
I ,a n d
both the levered ﬁrm and the all-equity ﬁrm invest immediately. In that case there are
no agency costs.
IV Optimal liquidity and capital structure choice
Up to now, we have taken the ﬁrm’s capital structure as given. Although we have analyzed
the eﬀect of leverage on investment in Section A, we have not discussed the optimal amount
of debt to be issued. In fact, our analysis throughout Section III omits tax eﬀects, with
the consequence that there is no model-endogenous reason at all to initially issue debt. In
this context, the easiest way to avoid agency costs of debt is to remain an all-equity ﬁrm.
Therefore we now generalize our analysis: We show that when there is a positive tax rate
τ>0, providing a reason to issue debt due to tax beneﬁts, then the relation of under-
investment, overinvestment, and liquidity elaborated in the previous section is preserved
also under this more general setup. Moreover, we can now study the interaction of liquid-
ity and capital structure choice as well as the trade-oﬀ between the value of tax beneﬁts
and the resulting agency costs upon debt issuance.
23A Debt issuance
We ﬁrst present the sequence of the debt issuance process. It takes place before state
o is reached, and it is visualized by a dotted arrow in Fig. 1. Consider a ﬁnancially
unconstrained entrepreneur who owns the investment option worth F e(V ) and follows the
all-equity exercise policy. Preparing for debt issuance, the entrepreneur ﬁrst provides an
amount of liquid funds X. Then the unlevered ﬁrm’s balance is given by Eq. (4).
In the next step, debt with a coupon C is issued. The prospective bondholder provides
ap a y m e n to fDo(V ) to the entrepreneur, and he correctly anticipates the value of his
position in the ﬁrm after debt issuance. Upon debt issuance, the levered ﬁrm’s balance
changes to Eq. (3). The entrepreneur’s optimization problem is to choose the liquid funds





o(V ) − E
e(V )=F
o(V ) − F
e(V )+T
o(V ).
The left-hand side expresses that the entrepreneur receives a value of Eo(V )+Do(V )
deﬁned by Eq. (16) and Eq. (20), but he has to give up Ee(V ) deﬁned by Eq. (4). This
also illustrates that at this point, he is still interested in maximizing the total value of
the entrepreneur’s and bondholder’s claims. The right-hand side allows the interpretation
that he trades oﬀ the loss in investment option value F o(V )−F e(V ) due to a suboptimal
exercise policy against the tax beneﬁts of debt T o(V ).
B Agency costs
At ﬁrst it might seem reasonable to deﬁne the agency costs of debt similar to Section
III by comparing the ﬁrm value after debt issuance to that of an all-equity ﬁrm. This
would correspond to the gain upon debt issuance given by Eq. (22). However, now an
all-equity ﬁrm can be made better oﬀ by issuing debt due to tax beneﬁts. In particular, a
ﬁrm that can credibly commit to the ﬁrst-best investment policy will in general increase
its value by issuing debt, although its value was not aﬀected by the choice of (X,C) for
24τ = 0. Therefore it is no longer suﬃcient to compare investment option values before and
after debt issuance, as was reasonable in Eq. (21). Rather, we have to take into account
on the one hand under- and overinvestment costs driving the option value below that of
an all-equity ﬁrm, and on the other hand costs due to foregone tax beneﬁts. Our new
deﬁnition of agency costs for τ ≥ 0i s
(23) ACτ≥0 =[ F
o1
(X1,C1)(V ) − F
o2
(X2,C2)(V )] + [T
o1
(X1,C1)(V ) − T
o2
(X2,C2)(V )]
The new superscript o1 denotes values given that the ﬁrst-best investment policy is fol-
lowed after debt issuance, which means that when deriving the ﬁrst-best investment
threshold V o1
I and bankruptcy threshold V o1


















has to be used. In contrast, for the second-best investment policy (superscript o2, corre-
sponds to o in the τ = 0 case) the ﬁrst-order condition at the investment threshold given










is still used. In general, the bankruptcy thresholds will also be diﬀerent, i.e., V o1
B  = V o2
B ,
although they are both chosen in the entrepreneur’s interest. That means that the ﬁrst-
order condition at the default threshold previously given by Eq. (18) can now be stated










Even in the ﬁrst-best case, when it is possible to credibly commit to the ﬁrst-best in-
vestment policy before debt issuance, the default threshold is not allowed to be chosen
beforehand. Otherwise it would be ex ante optimal to choose V o1
B = V o2
B =0 .I nt h a tc a s e ,
the ﬁrm would never default, which would indeed maximize the value of tax beneﬁts in
our modeling framework, but it would no longer represent the characteristics of a risky-
25debt ﬁnanced ﬁrm. Only for the special case that the entrepreneur’s net payment given
by Eq. (2) is negative, it is also ex post optimal from the entrepreneur’s perspective to
choose V o1
B = V o2
B = 0. Note that even in that case, a default threshold of V i
B > 0 after
investment will be ex post optimal.
The subscripts in Eq. (23) emphasize that if the entrepreneur can credibly commit to
the ﬁrst-best investment policy before debt issuance, she does not only choose diﬀerent
investment and bankruptcy thresholds. She also chooses a combination of liquid funds and
capital structure (X1,C 1) that will generally be diﬀerent from the combination (X2,C 2)
that she chooses for the second-best investment policy. Note that for τ = 0, the second
bracket in Eq. (23) disappears and F o1
(X1,C1)(V ) corresponds to F e(V ), so we end up again
at the deﬁnition given by Eq. (21).
C Numerical example and discussion
In a numerical example, we show the (X,C) combinations actually chosen in the ﬁrst-best
and second-best cases, as well as the value eﬀect of debt issuance and the resulting agency
costs of debt. Since option values and tax beneﬁts are connected to ﬁrm values by Eq. (3)












(X2,C2)(V ) − E
e
(X2)(V )] (24)
Each of the square brackets represents the gain upon debt issuance relative to the all-
equity ﬁrm for the ﬁrst-best and second-best cases, respectively. The value of the ﬁrst
bracket (ﬁrst-best case) as a function of the (X1,C 1) combination chosen by the ﬁrm is
shown in the ﬁrst graph of Fig. 6, while in the second graph the value of the second
bracket (second-best case) is shown as a function of (X2,C 2). Parameter values are again
given in Table 1. In contrast to Section III, we now use a positive tax rate of τ = 10%,
and the ﬁrm chooses the optimal levels of both liquidity and debt endogenously.
26For a ﬁrm that follows the ﬁrst-best investment policy, it can be seen in the ﬁrst graph of
Fig. 6 that the maximum gain by debt issuance is reached for the maximum level of liquid
funds, X∗
1 = I = 100. While the liquid funds are not needed in order to implement a
certain investment policy, they serve as a collateral and reduce the probability of default,
and therefore the tax beneﬁts can be enjoyed over a longer expected period of time. Since
collateral causes no direct costs in our model, it is indeed optimal to use the maximum
level of liquid funds. An interior level of debt (coupon C∗
1 =3 0 .02) is chosen in order to
achieve the maximum value of tax beneﬁts, which is a well-known result from dynamic
trade-oﬀ models.15
The second graph of Fig. 6 shows the change in ﬁrm value upon debt issuance given that
the ﬁrm follows the second-best investment policy. Still, the ﬁrm chooses an interior level
of debt (coupon C∗
2 =3 1 .02) close to that of the ﬁrst-best case. However, as a result of
the trade-oﬀ between tax beneﬁts and agency costs of debt, the maximum gain by debt
issuance is now reached for an interior level of liquid funds X∗
2 =7 2<I .
As shown for the case without tax beneﬁts in Fig. 5, the ﬁrm needs a certain level of liquid
funds in order to implement a second-best investment policy that mitigates conﬂicts of
interest between the entrepreneur and the bondholder as well as agency costs of under-
and overinvestment. Therefore it makes sense that the level of liquid funds X∗
2 is below
the maximum level of liquid funds, X∗
1 = I = 100, which is chosen by a ﬁrm that can
credibly commit to the ﬁrst-best investment policy. However, whereas minimizing the loss
F e(V ) − F o(V ) was the only eﬀect in Section III, the value of tax beneﬁts, T o(V ), now
has to be considered as well. Therefore the resulting X∗
2 is on the other hand above the
level of liquid funds X∗
0 that the ﬁrm chooses for a similar leverage when there are no tax
beneﬁts, until the marginal gain in tax beneﬁts equals the marginal agency costs.
The resulting maximum gains upon debt issuance are 14.23 in the ﬁrst-best case, and 13.49
in the second-best case, respectively. We can then use Eq. (24) and calculate the actual
agency costs of debt as the diﬀerence between the maximum gains upon debt issuance in
the ﬁrst- and second-best cases. In our numerical example this corresponds to a value of
15See e.g. Leland (1994).
2714.23 − 13.49 = 0.74. This means that the gain upon debt issuance in the second-best
case is about 5% smaller than in the ﬁrst-best case.
One could argue that the eﬀect of the agency costs of debt is rather small. However, this
is mainly due to the fact that the ﬁrm is signiﬁcantly adjusting its liquid fund holdings in
the second-best case. If the ﬁrm kept the maximum liquid fund holdings in the second-best
case (i.e., X2 = 100), there would be a maximum gain upon debt issuance of only 10.51.16
Then the agency costs of debt would amount to 14.23−10.51 = 3.72. This means that the
gain upon debt issuance in the second-best case would be more than 26% smaller than
in the ﬁrst-best case. Overall, our main conclusion from the analysis without tax beneﬁts
therefore remains valid: The ﬁrm’s liquid funds are an important factor determining the
agency costs of debt, and they have to be chosen carefully in order to avoid a signiﬁcant
loss in value.
In order to ensure the stability of our results, we carried out a comparative statics analysis.
We could conﬁrm that the basic qualitative structure remains unchanged for a wide range
of parameter values: While it is optimal to choose the maximum level of liquid funds in the
ﬁrst-best case, there is a signiﬁcantly lower level of liquid funds in the second-best case.
On the one hand, cash holdings help to increase tax beneﬁts. However, there would be a
tremendous overinvestment problem if the ﬁrm stuck to the ﬁrst-best policy of holding the
maximum level of liquid funds although it could not commit to the ﬁrst-best investment
policy.
V Implications and related work
The implications of our model for levered ﬁrms can be summarized as follows:
I. For a given interior level of liquidity, investment thresholds are U-shaped in leverage.
There is overinvestment for low leverage and underinvestment for high leverage.
16In this case, the optimal second-best coupon would be C2 =3 1 .69.
28II. For a given positive leverage, investment thresholds are decreasing in liquidity.
There is underinvestment for low liquidity and overinvestment for high liquidity.
III. An interior level of liquidity and leverage is optimal.
It trades oﬀ agency costs of debt (under- and overinvestment) and tax beneﬁts.
Most existing models concentrate on either under- or overinvestment. Among those, the
underinvestment eﬀect of Myers (1977) is examined more frequently. For example, a recent
paper by Moyen (2007) deals with that issue with respect to debt maturity.
In order to model the overinvestment eﬀect, the literature usually introduces quite speciﬁc
ﬁnancing contracts. One recent example is the article by Mauer and Sarkar (2005). The
authors assume that an otherwise all-equity ﬁrm issues a conditional debt contract, which
means that the coupon payment required for a given lending amount is already speciﬁed
ex ante, while the ﬁrm receives the lending amount at the time of investment. However,
the authors do not allow the ﬁrm to choose between several alternative pre-speciﬁed debt
contracts upon investment, but the exact level of leverage has to be speciﬁed ex ante.
Overinvestment can also be observed if a levered ﬁrm’s investment is partly ﬁnanced
using a new debt issue upon investment. This is examined in recent papers by Hennessy
(2004), Lyandres and Zhdanov (2008), and Sarkar (2007). Hennessy (2004) demonstrates
how the underinvestment problem can be mitigated by partly ﬁnancing a new investment
with secured debt. Lyandres and Zhdanov (2008) neutralize the underinvestment eﬀect
using a not necessarily optimal ﬁnancing contract and focus on overinvestment incentives
caused by the threat of costly default. In contrast, Sarkar (2007) derives the optimal
expansion debt ﬁnancing contracts from a ﬁrst-best and second-best perspective.
There is one article by Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005) that is particularly related to
our paper: In their approach, investment is also partly ﬁnanced using existing assets,
which allows them to capture both under- or overinvestment in one model. Like Moyen
(2007) and Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), the authors focus on the implications for the
ﬁrm’s debt maturity structure. They develop a rich model, but in their analysis they have
to conﬁne themselves to the comparison of two speciﬁc parametrizations representing
29either under- or overinvestment. It remains unclear which of the two ﬁrms’ characteristics
are most relevant for the fundamentally diﬀerent investment policies in either situation.
Moreover, the two investment environments are exogenous for the ﬁrms. There is no
endogenous decision on the asset side that would allow the ﬁrms to inﬂuence if they
actually face under- or overinvestment.
In contrast, this decision is the main focus of our paper. We propose the ﬁrm’s liquid
funds as an easily adjustable parameter on the asset side, which allows the ﬁrm to actively
inﬂuence the trade-oﬀ between under- and overinvestment.
Our Implication I is driven by the fact that we allow for an interior level of liquidity.
Whenever the investment situation is too close to a pure asset-expansion problem for
low liquid funds, or a pure asset-substitution problem for high liquid funds, then there is
monotonicity of the investment threshold in leverage. Since the above mentioned studies
examine these boundary cases, they do not ﬁnd investment thresholds that are U-shaped
in leverage.
Our Implications II and III are both directly related to the level of liquid funds and its
consequences for under- and overinvestment. Since the studies mentioned do not consider
the ﬁrm’s liquid funds explicitly, they do not ﬁnd these implications. Most related to
our Implication III is the ﬁnding of Sarkar (2007): In the case where a levered ﬁrm’s
investment is partly ﬁnanced using a new debt issue, the second-best policy is also the
result of a trade-oﬀ between agency costs of under- and overinvestment on the one hand,
and tax beneﬁts and bankruptcy costs on the other hand.
VI Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced the ﬁrm’s level of internal liquid funds as the key
factor that determines the eﬀect of existing debt on investment. We have shown that the
distortions in investment policy resulting from stockholder-bondholder agency conﬂicts
are increasing in the ﬁrm’s leverage. This holds for the extreme cases of a ﬁrm holding
30no liquid funds, resulting in underinvestment, and enough liquid funds to ﬁnance the
investment project, inducing overinvestment, respectively.
However, the two eﬀects interact for any interior level of liquid funds, inducing an invest-
ment threshold that is U-shaped in leverage: Overinvestment due to asset substitution and
risk-shifting incentives is more important for small amounts of debt. For higher leverage,
the reluctance to provide additional value to the bondholder and thus the underinvestment
argument becomes predominant. This is a central and new ﬁnding of our paper.
Note that we do not assume that the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained. In our case, under-
investment is not due to the ﬁrm’s diﬃculties to raise the investment amount on external
capital markets. Rather, the entrepreneur as the ﬁrm’s sole stockholder decides willingly
that she does not want to provide the amount since it also beneﬁts the bondholder. In
contrast, for a suﬃciently high level of liquidity being held within the ﬁrm, the bene-
ﬁts to the entrepreneur that arise from asset substitution outweigh the cost from asset
expansion, and overinvestment takes place.
Regarding the ﬁrm’s liquid funds as the decision variable for a given leverage level, we
conclude that investment thresholds are decreasing in liquidity for levered ﬁrms. There is
an optimal level of liquidity for which there is a trade-oﬀ between these two eﬀects, and
the ex ante optimal investment policy of an all-equity ﬁrm can be implemented. Even if
the latter is not directly enforceable, we can therefore eliminate the agency costs of debt.
For any other ﬁrm liquidity, the overall level of agency costs is determined by the degree
of deviation from the optimal level of liquidity.
Increasing project risk leads to earlier investment. This holds both in cases where there
is overinvestment and underinvestment, respectively. Consequently, whereas underinvest-
ment can be mitigated for increasing project risk, the overinvestment problem becomes
more severe when the entrepreneur has more incentives for risk-shifting. Again, the ex
ante optimal investment policy can still be implemented by choosing an appropriate, i.e.,
a lower level of liquidity for increasing project risk.
In a second step of our analysis, we have examined the interaction of liquidity and capital
31structure choice given that a tax advantage of debt makes leverage favorable. In that case,
a ﬁrm that can credibly commit to a certain investment policy has a motivation to issue
debt, and it will use the maximum level of liquid funds as a collateral for a higher value
of tax beneﬁts. In contrast, if the investment policy cannot be bound by contracts, the
ﬁrm chooses an interior level of liquid funds in order to implement an investment policy
that on the one hand mitigates conﬂicts of interest between the entrepreneur and the
bondholder on investment policy and on the other hand helps to increase the value of tax
beneﬁts.
Overall, we have shed light on the eﬀect of the ﬁrm’s level of liquidity for agency conﬂicts
in levered ﬁrms. Thus, we hope to contribute to a broader understanding of the importance
of liquidity beyond the context of ﬁnancing constraints.
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35Table 1: Parameter values used in numerical examples.
Parameter Value
Project investment cost I = 100
Project value volatility σ = 50%
Project cash-ﬂow rate δ =5 %


































V underlying project value
VB
s bankruptcy threshold (state s)
Vi
s investment threshold (state s)
Fs investment option value (state s)
I investment amount
X liquid funds
Es equity value (state s)
Ds debt value (state s)
Ts value of tax benefits (state s)
Figure 1: Transition of states.
This ﬁgure shows the possible state transitions of the ﬁrm contingent on the evolution of
the project value V . Starting in state o, the ﬁrm will invest as soon as V o
I is exceeded.
Then the entrepreneur has to provide the amount I −X. In contrast, if the project value
ﬁrst falls below V o
B, the ﬁrm will default. After default (state e), the former bondholder
will be the owner of an all-equity ﬁrm, and he decides when to invest by providing the
amount I −X as soon as V e
I is exceeded. On the other hand, default is still possible after
investment (state i), and the ﬁrm will default if the project value falls below V i
B.I ne i t h e r
of the latter states, the next transition leads to state ie in which both investment and
default have already taken place. The dotted arrow into state o represents the preceding
debt issuance decision of an all-equity ﬁrm.





















Figure 2: Levered ﬁrm’s investment threshold as a function of leverage.
The levered ﬁrm’s investment threshold V o
I , normalized by the investment threshold of the
unlevered ﬁrm V e
I , is shown for diﬀerent levels of liquid funds (solid lines) as a function
of the ﬁrm’s leverage measured by the debt coupon C. The ﬁrm follows the second-best
investment policy, i.e., the policy that is maximizing the value of the entrepreneur’s claim
after debt issuance. Also shown is the investment threshold of the unlevered ﬁrm, which
is normalized to 1 and independent of C, and the bankruptcy threshold after investment
V i
B/V e
I . The coupon level C0 will be ﬁxed in Fig. 3. Parameter values are given in Table
1, taxes are not considered (τ =0 ) .





















Figure 3: Levered ﬁrm’s investment threshold as a function of liquid funds.
The levered ﬁrm’s investment threshold V o
I , normalized by the investment threshold of
the unlevered ﬁrm V e
I , is shown as a function of the ﬁrm’s liquid funds X (for C = C0),
given that the ﬁrm follows the second-best investment policy, i.e., the policy that is
maximizing the value of the entrepreneur’s claim after debt issuance. Also shown are the
investment threshold of the unlevered ﬁrm which is normalized to 1 and the V0/V e
I =0 .75
line indicating the level later used as the initial project value, as well as the bankruptcy
thresholds before and after investment, V o
B and V i
B, respectively, again normalized by V e
I .
Parameter values are given in Table 1, taxes are not considered (τ =0 ) .
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Figure 4: Levered ﬁrm’s investment threshold for varying project value volatility.
The levered ﬁrm’s investment threshold V o
I (solid lines), normalized by the investment
threshold of the unlevered ﬁrm V e
I , is shown as a function of the ﬁrm’s leverage measured
by the debt coupon C (for X = X∗
0), and the ﬁrm’s liquid funds X (for C = C0),
respectively, given that the ﬁrm follows the second-best investment policy, i.e., the policy
that is maximizing the value of the entrepreneur’s claim after debt issuance. Also shown
is the investment threshold of the unlevered ﬁrm which is normalized to 1. Parameter
values are given in Table 1, taxes are not considered (τ =0 ) .










Change in Firm Value = −AC
Figure 5: Agency costs of debt.
The agency costs of debt, measured by the (negative) change in ﬁrm value upon debt
issuance, are shown as a function of the ﬁrm’s liquid funds X, given that the ﬁrm follows
the second-best investment policy, i.e., the policy that is maximizing the value of the
entrepreneur’s claim after debt issuance. Parameter values are given in Table 1, the initial
project value considered is V0 =0 .75V e









































Figure 6: Optimal liquidity and capital structure.
The change in ﬁrm value upon debt issuance is shown as a function of the ﬁrm’s liquid
funds X1/2 and debt coupon rate C1/2, given that the ﬁrm follows the ﬁrst-best investment
policy, i.e., the policy that is value-maximizing before debt issuance (ﬁrst graph), or
the second-best investment policy, i.e., the policy that is maximizing the value of the
entrepreneur’s claim after debt issuance (second graph), respectively. Parameter values
are given in Table 1, the initial project value considered is V0 =0 .75V e
I = 319.92, and the
tax rate is τ = 10%.
42 
 
Working Papers from Finance Research Group 
 
 
F-2009-04  Stefan Hirth & Marliese Uhrig-Homburg: Investment Timing, Liquidity, 
and Agency Costs of Debt. 
 
F-2009-03  Lasse Bork: Estimating US Monetary Policy Shocks Using a Factor-
Augmented Vector Autoregression: An EM Algorithm Approach. 
 
F-2009-02  Leonidas Tsiaras: The Forecast Performance of Competing Implied   
Volatility Measures: The Case of Individual Stocks. 
 
F-2009-01  Thomas Kokholm & Elisa Nicolato: Sato Processes in Default Modeling. 
 
F-2008-07  Esben Høg, Per Frederiksen & Daniel Schiemert: On the Generalized 
Brownian Motion and its Applications in Finance. 
 
F-2008-06  Esben Høg: Volatility and realized quadratic variation of differenced re-
turns. A wavelet method approach. 
 
F-2008-05  Peter Løchte Jørgensen & Domenico De Giovanni: Time Charters with Pur-
chase Options in Shipping: Valuation and Risk Management. 
 
F-2008-04  Stig V. Møller: Habit persistence: Explaining cross-sectional variation in 
returns and time-varying expected returns. 
 
F-2008-03  Thomas Poulsen: Private benefits in corporate control transactions. 
 
F-2008-02  Thomas Poulsen: Investment decisions with benefits of control. 
 
F-2008-01  Thomas Kokholm: Pricing of Traffic Light Options and other Correlation 
Derivatives. 
 
F-2007-03  Domenico De Giovanni: Lapse Rate Modeling: A Rational Expectation Ap-
proach. 
 
F-2007-02  Andrea Consiglio & Domenico De Giovanni: Pricing the Option to Sur-
render in Incomplete Markets. 
 
F-2006-09  Peter Løchte Jørgensen: Lognormal Approximation of Complex Path-
dependent Pension Scheme Payoffs. 
 
F-2006-08  Peter Løchte Jørgensen: Traffic Light Options. 
 
F-2006-07 David  C.  Porter,  Carsten Tanggaard, Daniel G. Weaver & Wei Yu:   
Dispersed Trading and the Prevention of Market Failure: The Case of the 
Copenhagen Stock Exhange. 
 




F-2006-05  Anne-Sofie Reng Rasmussen: How well do financial and macroeconomic 
variables predict stock returns: Time-series and cross-sectional evidence. 
 
F-2006-04  Anne-Sofie Reng Rasmussen: Improving the asset pricing ability of the 
Consumption-Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
 
F-2006-03  Jan Bartholdy, Dennis Olson & Paula Peare: Conducting event studies on a 
small stock exchange. 
 
F-2006-02  Jan Bartholdy & Cesário Mateus: Debt and Taxes: Evidence from bank-
financed unlisted firms. 
 
F-2006-01  Esben P. Høg & Per H. Frederiksen: The Fractional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
Process: Term Structure Theory and Application. 
 
F-2005-05    Charlotte Christiansen & Angelo Ranaldo: Realized bond-stock correlation: 
macroeconomic announcement effects. 
 
F-2005-04    Søren Willemann: GSE funding advantages and mortgagor benefits:  
    Answers from asset pricing. 
 
F-2005-03   Charlotte  Christiansen:  Level-ARCH short rate models with regime switch-
ing: Bivariate modeling of US and European short rates. 
 
F-2005-02  Charlotte Christiansen, Juanna Schröter Joensen and Jesper Rangvid: Do 
more economists hold stocks? 
 
F-2005-01  Michael Christensen: Danish mutual fund performance - selectivity, market 
timing and persistence. 
 






Department of Business Studies
Aarhus School of Business 
Aarhus University 
Fuglesangs Allé 4 
DK-8210 Aarhus V - Denmark 
 
Tel. +45 89 48 66 88 
Fax +45 86 15 01 88 
 
www.asb.dk  
 